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Abstract. Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) with autonomous de-
cision-making capabilities are of increasing interest for a wide area of
applications such as logistics and disaster recovery. In order to ensure
the correct behavior of the system and to recognize hazardous situa-
tions or system faults, we applied stream runtime monitoring techniques
within the DLR ARTIS (Autonomous Research Testbed for Intelligent
System) family of unmanned aircraft. We present our experience from
specification elicitation, instrumentation, offline log-file analysis, and on-
line monitoring on the flight computer on a test rig. The debugging and
health management support through stream runtime monitoring tech-
niques have proven highly beneficial for system design and development.
At the same time, the project has identified usability improvements to
the specification language, and has influenced the design of the language.
1 Introduction
Aerospace is an internationally harmonized, heavily regulated safety-critical do-
main. Aircraft development is guided by an uncompromising demand for safety,
and the integration of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) into populated airspace
is raising a lot of concerns. As the name suggests, there is no human pilot on
board an unmanned aircraft. The pilot is replaced by a number of highly auto-
mated systems, which also ensure proper synchronization with a base station on
the ground. The correctness and stability of these systems is critical for the safety
of the aircraft and its operating environment. As a result, substantial efforts in
verification and validation activities are required to comply with standards and
the high demand for functional correctness and safety.
Runtime verification has the potential to play a major role in the develop-
ment, testing, and operational control of unmanned aircraft. During develop-
ment, debugging is the key activity. Traditionally, log-files are inspected manu-
ally to find unexpected system behaviors. However, the manual analysis quickly
becomes infeasible if multiple interacting subsystems need to be considered or
if complex computations have to be carried out to correlate the data. Runtime
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verification can automate this task and thus make debugging dramatically more
efficient. During testing, runtime verification can be used to monitor functional
correctness of the system behavior. Runtime verification can be integrated into
software- and hardware-in-the-loop simulations as well as into full-scale flight
tests. In contrast to simple unit testing, a property that is formalized into a
runtime monitor can thus not only be tested in a test fixture, but reused in
all test phases. During operation, runtime verification can be used to monitor
the system health and the validity of environment assumptions. The reason that
system failures happen during a flight is often not because of implementation er-
rors, but because unforeseen events occur and the requirement assumptions are
no longer valid. Integrating runtime monitoring into operational control makes it
possible to enforce safety limitations, such as constraints on the altitude, speed,
geographic location and other operational aspects that increase the risk emerg-
ing from the unmanned aircraft. If all else fails, the runtime monitor can also
initiate contingency procedures and failsafes.
In this paper, we report on a case study, carried out over approximately one
year in a collaboration between Saarland University and the German Aerospace
Center (DLR). The goal has been to integrate runtime monitoring into the AR-
TIS (Autonomous Research Testbed for Intelligent Systems) platform. ARTIS
consists of a versatile software framework for the development and testing of
intelligent functions, as well as a fleet of unmanned aircraft, which include sev-
eral classes and sizes of aircraft with different technical equipment and resulting
autonomous capabilities [1, 20].
Integrating runtime monitoring into a complex flight operation framework
like ARTIS is a profound challenge. An immediate observation is that the data
to be monitored is complex, and typically requires nontrivial processing, which
necessitates a highly expressive specification language. At the same time, there
is no separation on the hardware level between the flight control operations and
the monitoring engine. Performance guarantees for the monitoring code, in par-
ticular with respect to memory usage, are therefore critically important. Finally,
we observed that there is a highly beneficial feedback loop between the results of
the monitoring and the continued design of the aircraft. The specifications used
for monitoring are increasingly used as a documentation of the expected envi-
ronment conditions and the legal system behavior. Clear, modular specifications
that can easily be reused and adapted are therefore a key requirement.
Our runtime verification approach is based on the Lola specification language
and monitoring engine [2, 7]. Lola specifications translate input streams, which
contain sensor information and other real-time data, into output streams, which
contain the processed sensor information and statistical aggregates over time.
While Lola is a very expressive specification language, it also comes with strong
performance guarantees: the efficiently monitorable fragment, which essentially
consists of the full language except that unbounded lookahead into the future
is not allowed, can be monitored with constant memory. In principle, Lola is
thus clearly in a good position for the task at hand. If Lola would be sufficiently
expressive for the monitoring of unmanned aircraft, and whether Lola specifica-
tions would be sufficiently modular and understandable for the interaction with
the developers, seemed far from obvious at the outset of our study.
The results reported in this paper are very positive. While Lola in its as-is
state was in fact not sufficiently expressive, the integration of the missing fea-
tures, essentially floating point arithmetic and trigonometric functions, turned
out to be straightforward. Lola’s organizational principle, where more complex
output streams are computed in terms of simpler output streams, was adapted
easily by developers, who appreciated the similarity to synchronous program-
ming. Small and, in retrospect, almost obvious additions to the language, such
as a switch statement for the description of state machines, made the specifica-
tion of the properties of interest significantly more natural and elegant.
The shortage of published case studies is an often lamented problem for
research in runtime verification. We hope that our formalization of common
properties of interest in the monitoring of unmanned aircraft can serve as a
reference for formalizations in other runtime verification frameworks. The major
lesson learned in our work is that while the development of such specifications
is extremely difficult and expensive, the benefits in terms of a more effective
debugging and testing process, and a mathematically rigorous documentation of
the expected system behavior are immense. Conversely, from the perspective of
the developer of a runtime verification tool, the insights gained into the practical
relevance of various language features are similarly invaluable.
2 Related Work
In the area of unmanned aerial systems, earlier work on applying runtime ver-
ification has been performed by Schumann, Rozier et. al. at NASA [8, 15, 17].
The key differences to our approach are our use of a stream-based specifica-
tion language with direct support for statistics, and that our framework uses a
software-based instrumentation approach, which gives access to the internal state
of system components. For non-assured control systems, a runtime supervision
approach has been described in [9]. A specific approach with a separate, verified
hardware system to enforce geo-fencing has been described in [4]. Specification
languages for runtime monitoring with similar expressivity include for example
eSQL as implemented in the BeepBeep system [10] and the Copilot language
in [12], which has been applied to monitor airspeed sensor data agreement.
3 Stream Runtime Monitoring
Lola is a stream-based specification language for monitoring, first presented for
monitoring synchronous circuits in [2], but more recently also used in the context
of network monitoring [7]. Lola is a declarative specification mechanism based
on stream equations and allows the specification of correctness properties as well
as statistical properties of the system under observation.
A Lola specification consists of a set of stream equations, which define a set
of input streams, i.e. the signals of the system to the monitor, and a set of output
streams, whose values are defined by stream expressions and have access to past,
present, and future values of the input streams and other output streams. All
streams have a synchronous clock and evolve in a uniform way.
Since the language includes streams with numeric types and the stream ex-
pressions allow arithmetic expressions, it is easy to specify incrementally com-
putable statistics. Algorithms for both offline and online monitoring of Lola spec-
ifications exist. In online monitoring, future values in stream expressions are
evaluated by delaying the evaluation of their output streams.
Consider the following example specification.
input bool valid
input double height
output double m_height
:= if valid { max(m_height[-1,0.0],height) }
else { m_height[-1,0.0] }
Here, given the input streams valid and height, the maximum valid height
m height is computed by taking the maximum over the previous m height and
the current height in case the height is valid, otherwise the previous value of
m height is used. In Lola, the offset operator s[x, y] handles the access to previ-
ous (x < 0), present (x = 0), or future (x > 0) stream values of the stream s.
The default value y is used in case an offset x tries to access a stream position
past the end or before the beginning of a stream.
In this section, we present syntactic Lola extensions, which were introduced
to adapt the language to the domain-specific needs of monitoring unmanned
aerial vehicles. For formal definitions of the syntax and semantics of the base
language syntax and semantics, we refer to [2] due to space reasons and will
restrict ourselves to the extensions.
Extensions to Lola A Lola Specification is a system of equations of stream ex-
pressions over typed stream variables of the following form:
input T1 t1
. . .
input Tm tm
output Tm+1 s1 := e1(t1, . . . , tm, s1, . . . sn)
. . .
output Tm+n sn := en(t1, . . . , tm, s1, . . . sn)
The independent stream variables t1, . . . , tm with types T1, . . . , Tm refer to input
streams, and the dependent stream variables s1, . . . , sn with types Tm+1, . . . , Tm+n
refer to output streams. The stream expressions e1, . . . , en have access to both
input streams and output streams. To construct a stream expression e, Lola
allows constants, functions, conditionals, and offset expressions to access the
values of other streams. Additionally, Lola specifications allow the definition
of triggers, which are conditional expressions over the stream variables. They
generate notifications whenever they are evaluated to true.
For a given valuation of input streams τ = 〈τ1, . . . , τm〉 of length N + 1, the
evaluation over the trace is defined as a stream of N + 1 tuples σ = 〈σ1, . . . , σn〉
for each dependent stream variable si, such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 0 ≤ j ≤ N ,
if the equation σi(j) = val(ei)(j) holds, then we call σ an evaluation model of
the Lola specification for τ . The definition of val(ei)(j) is given in [2] as a set of
partial evaluation rules, which tries to resolve the stream expressions as much
as possible for each incoming event.
For the two extensions described here, we extend the definition of the stream
expressions e(t1, . . . , tm, s1, . . . sn) and the function val as follows :
– Let a be keyword of type T (e.g. position, int min, int max representing
the maximal representable numbers), then e = a is an atomic stream ex-
pression of type T . This adds direct access to system dependent maximal
values for int min, int max, double min, double max, which is useful for
default values. Additionally, we add direct access to the current stream po-
sition via val(position)(j) = j.
– Let e′ be a stream expression of type T , d a constant of type T , and i a
positive int, then e = e′#[i, d] is a stream expression of type T . The value
of this absolute offset is defined as,
val(e#[p, d])(j) =
{
val(e)(p) if 0 ≤ p ≤ N
val(d)(j) otherwise
The absolute offset operator # refers to a position in the trace not relative
to the current position, but instead absolute to the start of the trace.
Common abbreviations:
• const T s := a =̂ output T s := a
• ite(e1,e2,e3) =̂ if e1{ea}else{eb}
• if e1{ea} elif e2{eb} else{ec} =̂ if e1{ea} else{if e2{eb} else{ec}}
• if ea = c1{e1} elif ea = c2{e2}. . . elif ea = cn{en} else{ed} =̂
switch ea{ case c1{e1} case c2{e2} . . . case cn{en} default{ed}}
We have also added an extended switch operator, where the switch condi-
tions have to be monotonically ordered. The semantics for this extended switch
condition allows us to short-circuit the evaluation of large case switches. There,
the evaluation of lower cases is omitted which helps e.g. for properties on dif-
ferent flight phases with a large case split (take off, flight, landing, . . . ) often
encountered in the encoding of state machines.
Usability Extensions We differentiate between two kinds of user feedback. On
the one hand, we have online feedback, where notifications are displayed during
the execution of the monitoring tool, on the other hand offline feedback, which
creates another log-file for further post-analysis. This log-file can then in return
be processed individually by the monitoring tool again, and is useful to first
extract sections of interest and then process them later in detail.
Online Feedback - Syntax: obs kind condition message
where condition is a boolean expression, and message is an arbitrary string.
The semantics for the different obs kind is defined as follows:
– trigger: Prints the message whenever the condition holds.
– trigger once: Prints the message only the first time the condition holds.
– trigger change: Prints the message whenever the condition value changes.
– snapshot: Prints the monitor state, i.e. the current stream values.
Offline Feedback - Syntax: tag as y1, . . . , yn if cond with x1, . . . , xn at l
where x1, . . . , xn are stream variables, y1, . . . , yn are pairwise distinct stream
names for the new log-file, and cond is a boolean expression. The semantics are
as following: Whenever cond holds, the value of xi is written to the respective yi
column in the new log-file at location l. These operations are especially interest-
ing in offline post-flight analysis where they can ease the reasoning by generating
enhanced log-files or by filtering the bulk of data to relevant fragments.
A special variant of this tagging operator is filtering, defined syntactically as:
filter s1, ..., sn if cond at l :=
tag as s1, ..., sn if cond with s1, ..., sn at l
This operator copies all input streams to a new log-file, but filters on cond.
The syntax of Lola permits not well-defined specifications, i.e. where no
unique evaluation model exists. Since the requirement of a unique evaluation
model is a semantic criterion and expensive to check, we check a stronger syntac-
tic criterion, namely well-formedness, which implies well-definedness. The well-
formedness check can be performed on the dependency graph for a Lola specifica-
tion, where the vertices of the multi-graph are stream names, and edges represent
accesses to other streams. Weights on the edges are defined by the offset values
of the accesses to other streams. As stated in [2], if the dependency graph of a
specification does not contain a zero-weight cycle, then the specification is well-
formed. If the dependency graph additionally has no positive-weight cycles, then
the specification falls into the efficiently monitorable fragment. Intuitively, this
means it does not contain unbounded lookahead to future values of streams.
Implementation For the study, Lola has been implemented in C. Since most of
the specifications discovered during this case study fall into the efficiently mon-
itorable fragment of Lola, we focused on tuning the performance for this frag-
ment. In [2], the evaluation algorithm maintains two equation stores. Resolved
equations are stored in R and unresolved equations are stored in U . Unresolved
equations are simplified due to partial evaluation, rewrite, and substitution rules
and, if resolved, added to R. Evaluated stream expressions are removed from R
whenever their largest offset has passed. Our implementation uses an array for
R and an inverted index for U , for convenience we call the array for R past
array and the inverted index for U future index. By analyzing the dependency
graph, we are able to calculate the size of the past index and can therefore pre-
allocate a memory region once on initialization. The future index stores as keys
the awaiting stream values and maps them to the respective waiting streams.
Here, we use the dependency graph to determine a fixed stream evaluation order
to minimize the accesses to yet unresolved stream values. Both data structures
offer a fast access to values, the past index due to smart array indexing based
on a flattening of the syntax tree of the stream expressions and the future index
due to a simple lookup call for streams waiting on the resolution of a value.
4 ARTIS Research Platform
The DLR is researching UAS, especially regarding aspects of system autonomy
and safety, utilizing its ARTIS platform. The software framework enables devel-
opment and test of intelligent functions that can be integrated and used with a
whole fleet of UAS, comprised of several classes of aircraft with different tech-
nical equipment and autonomous capabilities. The latest addition to the DLR
fleet is superARTIS, with a maximum take-off weight of 85 kg, Fig. 1. A num-
ber of highly automated subsystems enables unmanned operations and provides
required onboard functionality. As strict regulations apply, significant efforts in
verification and validation activities are required to comply with standards to en-
sure functional correctness and safety. For the platform, there has been previous
work on software verification as well as certification aspects for UAS [18–21].
Fig. 1: One example UAS of the
DLR Unmanned Aircraft Fleet: Su-
perARTIS, a dual rotor configura-
tion vehicle, shown with complete
flight computers and sensor setup.
Fig. 2: A simulation of autonomous
exploration of an unknown area
with onboard perception: path
flown (red), virtual distance sen-
sor (green), obstacles mapped
(grayscale).
Recently published supplements [14] to existing development standards for
safety critical software [13] introduced a regulatory framework to apply formal
methods for the verification of aircraft. However, due to a lack of expertise, there
are some barriers for introduction of formal methods in industry [3]. Within our
cooperation, starting with the use of runtime monitoring, the goal is to gradually
introduce formal methods into the ARTIS development. The use of runtime
monitoring can support several aspects of research, development, verification,
the operation, and even the autonomy of an unmanned aircraft.
ARTIS is based on a guidance, navigation, control (GNC) architecture as
illustrated in Fig. 3, to be able to define high-level tasks and missions while also
maintaining low-level control of the aircraft.
The flight control realizes the control layer, that uses a model of the flight
behavior to command the actuators so that the aircraft achieves desired po-
sition, height, speed, and orientation. This system has to cope with external
disturbances and keep the aircraft precisely on a given trajectory. The naviga-
tion filter is responsible for sensor input, such as GPS, inertial measurement,
magnetic measurement. The main task of the navigation filter module is the fu-
sion of this heterogeneous information into consistent position information. The
top-level component of the guidance layer is the mission manager, which does
mission planning and execution, breaking high-level objectives such as the ex-
ploration and mapping of an unknown area into actionable tasks by generation
of suitable waypoints and the path planning to find an optimal route, Fig. 2.
Fig. 3: ARTIS system overview.
The three-tier architecture has the advantage of different abstraction layers
that can be interfaced directly such that each layer represents a level of system
autonomy. The ARTIS unmanned aircraft have been evaluated in flight tests
with respect to closed-loop motion planning in obstacle rich environments.
In flight, all modules are continuously generating an extensive amount of
data, which is logged into files together with sensor data. This logging capability
is important for the post flight traceability. Log analysis can however quickly
become infeasible due to interacting subsystems and possibly emergent aspects
of the system. Data from log-files has to be processed for analysis and may need
to be correlated with a context from a different module. Runtime monitoring
can support these aspects, by automating the analysis of log-files for specific
properties. An important feature is to filter only relevant log data, according
to specific properties of the observation and tag it with a keyword for further
analysis. These properties can be introduced before conducting an experiment
or simulation, or after the fact, since all relevant data is being saved to a log-file.
The software framework consists of a large code base with many modules
and interfaces, which is under constant development. Interface changes triggered
by a change in a single module are a significant problem during development,
since other modules rely on implicit interface assumptions. Those assumptions
together with a specification of a module can be monitored to detect inconsisten-
cies early. They include internal properties of a subsystem, interface assumptions
of a module, but also environmental assumptions of the overall aircraft.
The explicit specification of assumptions is useful for system documentation,
testing and verification, but also for the operation of the aircraft itself. In con-
trast to simple unit testing, a property that is formalized into a runtime monitor
can not only be tested in a test fixture, but scale to the test phase. Runtime
monitoring can be integrated into software- and hardware-in-the-loop simula-
tions as well as full-scale flight tests, allowing the direct analysis for complex
properties. Since a formal specification mechanism is used, this also allows some
reuse in other formal verification methodologies, e.g. for LTL model checking.
System failures often occur not due to implementation errors, but because
of the inherent difficulty of specifying all relevant system requirements correctly,
completely, and free of contradictions. In nominal operation, the system behaves
correctly, but as unforeseen events occur and environment assumptions are no
longer valid, the system fails. Integrating runtime monitoring into normal sys-
tem operation allows to continuously monitor for environmental assumptions and
abnormal system behavior and allows to initiate contingency and failsafe proce-
dures in case of unforeseen events. In particular, EASA [5,6] and JARUS [11] are
working on concepts for the integration of unmanned aircraft into airspace that
rely on the definition of specific operational limitations. Here, the certification is
no longer only dependent on the aircraft, but on the combination of it with the
specific operation. Limitations, such as constraining the altitude, the speed, the
geographic location, etc. of the operation can have a significant impact on the
actual safety risk that emerges from the unmanned aircraft. Runtime verification
can support the safety of the aircraft by monitoring these limitations.
5 Representative Specifications
In this section, we will give some insights into representative classes of specifi-
cations, which have been used for stream runtime monitoring within the DLR
ARTIS UAS fleet. These range from low-level sensor data validation and ensur-
ing that the product of the sensor fusion is within the assumptions of the later
stages of the control loop, to computing flight phase statistics, and validating
the state machine of the mission planning and execution framework. The speci-
fications have been obtained by interviewing the responsible engineers for each
component and collaborative specification writing. They have been validated by
offline analysis of known test runs. The full set of specifications developed in the
study can be found in [16]. Note that due to the time-triggered nature of the
system design, all incoming signals to the monitor are timestamped and arrive
with a frequency of 50 Hz. For the following specifications, the integration of the
respective monitor instance is depicted in Figure 3.
5.1 Sensor Data Validation
1 input double lat, lon, ug, vg, wg, time_s, time_micros
2 output double time := time_s + time_micros / 1000000.0
3 output double flight_time := time - time#[0,0.0]
4 output double frequency := switch position{
5 case 0 { 1.0 / ( time[1,0.0] - time ) }
6 default { 1.0 / ( time - time[-1,0.0] ) } }
7 output double freq_sum := freq_sum[-1,0.0] + frequency
8 output double freq_avg := freq_sum / double(position+1)
9 output double freq_max := max( frequency, freq_max[-1,double_min] )
10 output double freq_min := min( frequency, freq_min[-1,double_max] )
11
12 output double velocity := sqrt( ug^2.0 + vg^2.0 + wg^2.0 )
13 const double R := 6373000.0
14 const double pi := 3.1415926535
15
16 output double lon1_rad := lon[-1,0.0] * pi / 180.0
17 output double lon2_rad := lon * pi / 180.0
18 output double lat1_rad := lat[-1,0.0] * pi / 180.0
19 output double lat2_rad := lat * pi / 180.0
20
21 output double dlon := lon2_rad - lon1_rad
22 output double dlat := lat2_rad - lat1_rad
23 output double a := (sin(dlat/2.0))^2.0 +
24 cos(lat1_rad) *
25 cos(lat2_rad) *
26 (sin(dlon/2.0))^2.0
27 output double c := 2.0 * atan2( sqrt(a), sqrt(1.0-a) )
28 output double gps_distance := R * c
29
30 output double passed_time := time - time[-1,0.0]
31 output double distance_max := velocity * passed_time
32 output double dif_distance := gps_distance - distance_max
33 const double delta_distance := 1.0
34 output bool detected_jump := switch position {
35 case 0 { false }
36 default { dif_distance > delta_distance } }
37 snapshot detected_jump with "Invalid GPS signal received!"
Listing 1.1: The specification used for Sensor Data Validation
In Listing 1.1, we validate the output of the navigation part of the sensor
fusion. Given the sensor data, e.g. GPS position and the inertial measurement,
the navigation filter outputs vehicle state estimates, depicted in Figure 3. Based
on this specification, the monitor checks the frequency of incoming signals and
detects GPS signal jumps. The detection of frequency deviations can point to
problems in the signal-processing chain, e.g. delayed, missing, or corrupted sen-
sor values (Line 4 to 10). Since the vehicle state estimation is used for control
decisions, errors would propagate through the whole system. From Line 21 to
37, the GPS signal jumps are computed by the Haversine formula. It compares
the traveled distance, first by integrating over the velocity values received by the
IMU unit, and second by computing the distance as measured by the GPS coor-
dinates. All calculations are performed in Lola and compared against a threshold.
Since the formula expects the latitude and longitude in radians and we receive
them in decimal degree, we convert them first (Line 16 to 19).
5.2 Flight Phase Detection
1 input double time_s, time_micros, vel_x, vel_y, vel_z,
2 fuel, power, vel_r_x, vel_r_y, vel_r_z
3 output double time := time_s + time_micros / 1000000.0
4 output double flight_time := time - time#[0,0.0]
5 output double frequency := switch position{
6 case 0 { 1.0 / ( time[1,0.0] - time ) }
7 default { 1.0 / ( time - time[-1,0.0] ) } }
8 output double freq_sum := freq_sum[-1,0.0] + frequency
9 output double freq_avg := freq_sum / double(position+1)
10 output double freq_max := max( frequency, freq_max[-1,double_min] )
11 output double freq_min := min( frequency, freq_min[-1,double_max] )
12
13 const double vel_bound := 1.0
14 output double velocity := sqrt( vel_x^2.0 + vel_y^2.0 + vel_z^2.0 )
15 output double velocity_max := if reset_max[-1,false] { velocity }
16 else { max( velocity, velocity_max[-1,0.0]) }
17 output double velocity_min := if reset_max[-1,false] { velocity }
18 else { min( velocity, velocity_min[-1,0.0]) }
19 output double dif_max := difference(velocity_max, velocity_min)
20 output bool reset_max := dif_max > vel_bound
21 output double reset_time := if reset_max | position = 0 { time }
22 else { reset_time[-1,0.0] }
23 output int unchanged := if reset_max[-1,false] { 0 }
24 else { unchanged[-1,0] + 1 }
25 snapshot unchanged = 150 with "Phase detected!"
26
27 output double vel_dev := difference(vel_r_x,vel_x) + difference(vel_r_y,vel_y)
28 + difference(vel_r_z,vel_z)
29 output double dev_sum := vel_dev + dev_sum[-1,0]
30 output double vel_av := dev_sum / double((position+1)*3)
31 output int worst_dev_pos := if worst_dev[-1,double_min] < vel_dev { position }
32 else { worst_dev_pos[-1,0] }
33 output double worst_dev := if worst_dev[-1,double_min] < vel_dev { vel_dev }
34 else { worst_dev[-1,0.0] }
35
36 output double fuel_p := ( ( fuel#[0,0.0] - fuel ) / (fuel#[0,0.0]+0.01) )
37 output double power_p := ( (power#[0,0.0] - power) / (power#[0,0.0]+0.01) )
38 trigger_once fuel_p < 0.50 with "Fuel below half capacity"
39 trigger_once fuel_p < 0.25 with "Fuel below quarter capacity"
40 trigger_once fuel_p < 0.10 with "Urgent: Refill Fuel!"
41 trigger_once power_p < 0.50 with "Power below half capacity"
42 trigger_once power_p < 0.25 with "Power below quarter capacity"
43 trigger_once power_p < 0.10 with "Urgent: Recharge Power!"
Listing 1.2: The specification used for Flight Phase Detection
The mission manager describes high-level behaviors, e.g. the hover or the
fly-to behavior. The hover behavior implies that the aircraft remains at a fixed
location whereas the fly-to behavior describes the movement from a source to a
destination location. These high-level behaviors are then automatically synthe-
sized into low-level control commands which are send to the flight control. Given
the state estimation, the flight control then smoothes the control commands into
applicable actuator commands, (vel r x, vel r y, vel r z ), depicted in Figure 3.
Hence, the actuator commands implement the desired high-level behavior. Since
the actuator movements are limited and therefore smoothed by the flight control,
there is a gap between the control commands and the actuator commands.
In Listing 1.2, monitoring is used to recognize flight phases where the velocity
of the aircraft stays below a small bound for longer than three seconds (Line
13 to 25). In post-flight analysis, the recognized phases can be compared to the
high-level commands to validate the suitability of the property for the respective
behavior. Furthermore, from Line 3 to 11, the frequency is examined and, from
Line 27 to 34, the deviations between the reference velocity, given by the flight
controller, and the actual velocity (vel x, vel y, vel z ) are detected. Bound checks
on fuel and power detect further boundary conditions and produce notifications
for the difference urgency levels.
5.3 Mission Planning and Execution
1 input double time_s, time_micros
2 input int stateID_SC, OnGround
3 const int Start := 0
4 const int MissionControllerOff := 1
5 ...
6 const int HammerHeadTurn := 16
7
8 output double time := time_s + time_micros / 1000000.0
9 output double flight_time := time - time#[0,0.0]
10
11 output bool change_state := switch position {
12 case 0 { false }
13 default { stateID_SC != stateID_SC[-1,-1] } }
14 trigger change_state
15
16 output string state_enum := switch stateID_SC {
17 case 0 { "Start" }
18 case 1 { "MissionControllerOff" }
19 ...
20 case 16{ "HammerHeadTurn" }
21 default{ "Invalid" } }
22 output string state_trace :=
23 switch position { case 0 { state_enum } default {
24 if change_state { concat(concat(state_trace[-1,""]," -> "),state_enum) }
25 else { state_trace[-1,""] } } }
26
27 output double entrance_time := if change_state { time }
28 else { entrance_time[-1,0.0] }
29 const double landing_timebnd := 20.0
30 output double landing_info := if stateID_SC = Landing { 0.0 }
31 else { time - entrance_time[-1,0.0] }
32 output bool landing_error := stateID_SC = Landing & OnGround != 1 &
33 landing_info > landing_timebound
Listing 1.3: The specification used for Mission Planning and Execution
The mission planning and execution component within the ARTIS control
software is responsible for executing uploaded flight missions onboard the air-
craft. The received mission from the ground control station is planned based on
the current state estimate of the vehicle and the sensed obstacles, depicted in
Figure 3. The mission manager and its internal planner essentially consists of a
large state machine which controls the parameters of the current flight state. In
the corresponding specification seen in Listing 1.3, the state machine is encoded
into the specification, and the state trace is recovered from the inputs and con-
verted to a readable form. Starting in Line 27 of the specifications, we record
entrance and exit times of certain flight states, and check a landing time bound to
ensure a bounded liveness property. With this specification, we are able to detect
invalid transition and ensure a landing time bound. In an extended version, we
further specified properties for each location. Specifically, we aggregated statis-
tics on the fuel consumption, the average velocity, and the maximal, average,
and total time spend in the respective location.
6 Monitoring Experiments
6.1 Offline Experiments
The experiments indicate how Lola performs with the given set of specifica-
tions in an offline monitoring context. This mode was especially useful during
specification development, because a large number of flight log-files was readily
available and could be used to debug the developed specifications.
As offline parameters, Lola receives one or more specifications and the log
data file. As an optional parameter, a location for the monitor output can be set.
The offline experiments were conducted on a dual-core machine with an 2.6GHz
Intel Core i5 processor with 8GB RAM. The input streams files were stored on
an internal SSD. Runtime results are shown in Figure 4. Memory consumption
was below 1.5 MB. The simulated flight times range up to 15 minutes.
Fig. 4: The results of the offline experiments for the specifications presented in
Section 5.
The experimental results show that our implementation could process the
existing log-files in this application context within seconds. Using an additional
helper tool, which automatically runs offline monitoring on a set of given log-
files, and further specifications, we were able to identify system boundaries and
thresholds without further effort.
6.2 Online Experiments
The Lola online interface is written in C++. Due the absence of both a software
bus and a hardware bus, the monitor interface is coupled to the existing logging
interface. Therefore, we can use the created log-files to evaluate the monitor
impact on the system by comparing the logged frequencies.
The Hardware-in-the-loop (HiL) experiments were run on a flight computer
with an Intel Pentium with a 1.8GHz and 1GB RAM, running a Unix-based
RTOS. As inter-thread communication, we use shared memory for both the
stream value delivery and the monitor output. A simulated world environment
and a flight mission were set, the worlds and the missions are depicted in Figure 6.
In the experiments, we monitored the system with a superset of the specifications
described in Section 5. We evaluated the impact of online monitoring as following.
For each mission, all experiments flew the same planned route without noticeable
deviations, analyzed per manual inspection of an online visualization of the flight
as seen in Figure 6. To measure the system performance impact, we compare
the average frequency determined by the timestamps in the monitor, if available
for the component, otherwise with the frequency computed afterwards by offline
monitoring on the logs of the experiment with the average frequency of a non-
monitored execution.
Fig. 5: Test rig for hardware-in-the-
loop (HITL) experiments.
Fig. 6: Tracked flight-paths of two sce-
narios. On top, we see a hover simula-
tion and at the bottom a fly-to simu-
lation.
The results for hardware-in-the-loop testing are given in Figure 7. The exper-
monitor (evalstep) online - AvgFreq offline - AvgFreq
nav ctrl mgr gps-p gps-v imu mgn
(Hz) (Hz) (Hz) (Hz) (Hz) (Hz) (Hz)
No Monitor 50.0 50.0 50.0 20.0 20.0 100.0 10.0
nav monitor (1) 50.0 50.0 50.0 20.0 20.0 100.0 10.0
nav monitor (1) 50.0 - 50.0 20.0 20.0 100.0 10.0
ctrl monitor (1) - 50.0 - ” ” ” ”
nav monitor (1) 50.0 - - 20.0 20.0 100.0 10.0
ctrl monitor (1) - 50.0 - ” ” ” ”
mgr monitor (1) - - 50.0 ” ” ” ”
nav monitor (100) 50.1 - - 20.0 20.0 100.1 10.0
ctrl monitor (100) - 50.3 - ” ” ” ”
mgr monitor (100) - - 50.2 ” ” ” ”
Fig. 7: Monitor performance results. The first line denotes the reference values
without monitors, and more monitors are added in the further lines. The evalstep
parameter represents the amount of buffering of input values before evaluation
is triggered. Bold values denote frequencies measured online with Lola, the other
frequency values have been determined after the test by offline analysis.
imental results show that the timing behavior, i.e. the frequencies, are minimally
affected. Thus, the current implementation is sufficiently fast for online moni-
toring in this experimental setting. The monitoring approach can run aside the
logging. By setting the evalstep parameter to 100 to simulate a data burst for a
monitor evaluation step, the sensitive time-triggered system is slightly affected.
7 Conclusion
We have presented our experience from a successful case study for stream-based
runtime monitoring with Lola in a safety-critical application environment. The
DLR ARTIS family of unmanned aerial vehicles provides a unique research
testbed to explore the applicability of runtime monitoring in this application.
Our experiences show that the integration of runtime monitoring into an ex-
isting system has benefits for both the system and its development process. While
the primary goal is to ensure the correct behavior of the system, monitor the
health of the system components, and possibly trigger fail-safe strategies, there
are a number of secondary effects on the system development process, which may
aid the adoption of runtime verification techniques. Those benefits include time
savings during system debugging, a common and faster way to perform log-file
analysis, and a better documentation of interface assumptions of components.
The re-use of the same specifications in all contexts increases their appeal. The
specification development has already influenced the language and system imple-
mentation of our stream-based specification language. The presented extensions
improve the readability of specifications, and the insight that efficiently moni-
torable specifications suffice for online monitoring guides optimization efforts in
the implementation. The equation-based, declarative specification style of Lola
with a rich type and function supports its use in a real engineering project.
As the adaptation of autonomy into the system designs of regulated indus-
tries increases, we expect runtime monitoring to play an important role in the
certification process of the future. Runtime verification techniques allow the de-
ployment of trusted, verified components into systems in unreliable environments
and may be used to trigger pre-planned contingency measures to robustly con-
trol hazardous situations. To perform these important tasks, the monitor needs
to comprehensively supervise the internal state of the system components to in-
crease the self-awareness into the system health and to trigger a timely reaction.
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